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From the Howey Test to Verifiable Regulation: Crypto-Asset Classification Cannot Be Based on Form Alone

Value Source, Managerial Dependence, and Verifiable Structure Are the Key Criteria for Determining the Nature of Crypto Assets

Through the previously published series of articles and the book “From Double-Entry Bookkeeping to the Revolution of Verifiable Finance“, readers have already understood that when credit shifts from trusting institutions to verifying facts, the foundation of credit changes, and everything changes with it. Regulation is one of the important breakthrough points of verifiable theory. This article discusses a foundational issue in the latest U.S. interpretation of crypto-asset regulation from the perspective of verifiable thinking.

The latest interpretation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regarding certain types of crypto assets and certain transactions involving crypto assets marks an important step in U.S. crypto-asset regulation: a shift from enforcement uncertainty toward classification-based regulation. It recognizes that not all crypto assets are securities in themselves, and it attempts to draw boundaries among digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, payment stablecoins, and digital securities. This direction is correct.

But classification alone is not enough. The real difficulty in crypto-asset regulation is not merely to attach labels such as “security,” “commodity,” “tool,” “collectible,” or “stablecoin” to a token. The deeper questions are: where does the value of a crypto asset come from? What rights does the holder possess? Does its value depend on the continuing managerial efforts of others? Can the key facts be independently verified? If there are false statements, misappropriation of assets, rule changes, or unfulfilled promises, can responsibility be traced?

Without these underlying questions, regulatory classification can easily remain at the level of form. Formal classification may reduce market uncertainty, but it is not sufficient to explain the change in the way financial credit is generated in the AI+Crypto era. This is also the situation discussed in “Old Theories Cannot Explain the New World: From the Industrial Revolution to the AI+Crypto Revolution“: when new facts have already emerged while old theories continue to use old language to explain new problems, the real problem has only just begun.

What truly needs to be established is not merely a token classification system, but a regulatory theory grounded in verifiability.

This article does not comment on the specific provisions of the latest U.S. interpretation one by one. Instead, from the perspective of verifiable finance, it discusses the conceptual foundations most easily overlooked in the classification and regulation of crypto assets.

I. U.S. Regulation Has Taken an Important Step, but It Still Lacks a Deeper Theoretical Framework

For a long time, one of the greatest problems in U.S. crypto-asset regulation has been the mismatch between regulatory language and market facts. Many projects have faced not clear rules, but uncertain enforcement risk. Regulators have often started from traditional securities law and placed crypto assets into old frameworks such as the Howey test, investment contracts, issuance disclosure, broker-dealer regulation, and trading platform regulation.

This approach is not without basis. Securities law protects investors, prevents fraud and material omissions, and requires issuers to assume disclosure obligations. These principles remain important. The problem is that crypto assets are not a single type of asset. Bitcoin, Ethereum, NFTs, governance tokens, gaming items, stablecoins, RWA tokens, exchange platform tokens, and tokenized stocks have entirely different rights structures, value sources, and degrees of managerial dependence.

The significance of the latest U.S. regulatory interpretation lies precisely in its recognition of these differences. It no longer simply compresses all crypto assets into the securities framework, but attempts to distinguish among digital commodities, digital collectibles, digital tools, payment stablecoins, and digital securities. This is a step toward regulatory rationality.

But the deeper question remains unresolved: what is the basis of classification? If classification is based only on asset appearance, issuance method, functional description, and market use, boundaries will still become blurred. The true basis of classification should return to value source, rights structure, managerial dependence, degree of verifiability, and responsibility traceability.

II. The Core of the Howey Test Is Not “Whether the Asset Rises in Price,” but “Whether It Depends on the Managerial Efforts of Others”

Any discussion of crypto-asset regulation must address the Howey test. In essence, the Howey test is the standard used by U.S. courts to determine whether an arrangement constitutes an investment contract. Its core concern is not whether the price of an asset may rise, nor whether the buyer hopes to make a profit, but whether the buyer expects to obtain profits from a common enterprise based on reliance on the managerial efforts of others.

This distinction is extremely important. Gold may rise in price; artwork may rise in price; collectibles may rise in price; real estate may rise in price. But they do not automatically become securities for that reason. Price appreciation itself is not the core concern of securities law. The real concern of securities law is whether buyers have entrusted capital to an operator, manager, or project team and rely on that party’s continuing efforts to create returns.

Therefore, the Howey test naturally applies to scenarios closely connected with enterprise value, operating income, profit distribution, and managerial efforts. Traditional stocks, fund interests, certain investment contracts, and certain token financing arrangements may all fall within this logic.

But assets such as Bitcoin are different. Bitcoin does not represent ownership, dividend rights, creditor rights, or profit claims in a company. Its value does not come from a management team’s promise to operate a business for profit. It comes from a credit structure formed by verifiable rules, an open ledger, scarcity mechanisms, network effects, global liquidity, and market acceptance. Applying the Howey test directly to this type of asset inevitably encounters boundary problems.

III. Crypto-Asset Classification Cannot Be Based on Form Alone; It Must Ask Five Foundational Questions

The real difficulty in crypto-asset regulation is not token classification, but value source and verifiability. Regulation should not merely ask what a token is called. It should ask where its value comes from, who promises the rights, whether the facts can be verified, and whether responsibility can be traced.

First, value source. Does the value of the asset mainly come from enterprise operation, profit expectations, and managerial efforts, or from scarcity rules, ledger history, network effects, market liquidity, and continuous verification?

Second, rights structure. Does the holder possess dividend rights, profit claims, creditor rights, asset claims, governance control, or other legally enforceable rights?

Third, managerial dependence. Does the buyer’s expectation of return mainly depend on the continuing efforts of an issuer, foundation, development team, platform, operating entity, or coordination institution?

Fourth, degree of verifiability. Can issuance rules, supply caps, burn mechanisms, ledger history, reserve status, liability relationships, settlement status, permission changes, and responsibility records be independently reviewed?

Fifth, responsibility traceability. If facts are false, promises are not honored, rules are changed, assets are misappropriated, or information is concealed, is there a clear responsible party and a replayable evidentiary chain?

These five questions are more fundamental than “whether it is on-chain,” “whether it is decentralized,” “whether it has utility,” or “whether it is called an NFT.” Formal labels can describe the appearance of an asset, but they cannot explain its nature.

IV. Bitcoin Is Not an Ordinary Commodity or an Enterprise Security, but a Typical Example of Verifiable Network Value

It is basically correct for U.S. regulation to classify assets such as Bitcoin in the direction of digital commodities. But it is still not accurate enough to explain Bitcoin’s value as deriving from the “programmatic operation of a crypto system” itself. Programmatic system operation is a necessary condition, but not the complete source of value.

Bitcoin’s value does not come from the operating profit of an enterprise system, nor from the commercial efforts of a management team. Its value comes from scarcity rules, an open ledger, verifiable issuance, verifiable transaction history, long-term operation, continuous global node verification, tamper-resistant records, and network effects, which together form a verifiable credit structure. It is also supported by market liquidity and holder consensus.

More precisely, Bitcoin is not an ordinary consensus asset. It is a network-value asset supported by a verifiable structure. Consensus can form price, but only a verifiable structure can support credit. Without verifiable issuance rules, verifiable ledger history, and a verifiable supply cap, consensus may be no more than short-term sentiment, a market bubble, or narrative speculation. Bitcoin’s special character lies in the fact that its consensus is not suspended in the air; it has long been supported by a verification mechanism.

This is also the fundamental difference between Bitcoin and traditional securities. The value of a security usually represents the value of an enterprise, operating entity, or rights structure. Bitcoin’s value mainly comes from an open, continuous, and verifiable public credit structure. It has no traditional dividend, but it has scarcity rules; it has no board of directors, but it has an open ledger; it has no corporate balance sheet, but it has a globally verifiable history.

Therefore, Bitcoin should not be simply explained as “value generated by system operation.” It is the earliest public credit root sample to emerge in the era of verifiable finance.

V. Intermediate Assets Such as Ethereum Require Simultaneous Analysis of Network Value and Managerial Influence

Ethereum is different from Bitcoin. Ethereum also has network effects, an on-chain ledger, open rules, and verifiable history, but it also involves more complex developer influence, foundation influence, upgrade mechanisms, ecosystem governance, and protocol adjustments.

This does not mean that Ethereum is necessarily a security. Many mature network assets no longer primarily depend on the managerial efforts of a single issuer. Their value comes more from network use, ecosystem applications, liquidity, the developer community, and market consensus. But compared with Bitcoin, Ethereum has stronger capacity for rule changes, a more complex ecosystem organization, and more visible governance influence. Therefore, regulatory analysis must be more refined.

These assets occupy an intermediate zone between “enterprise value” and “verifiable network value.” Regulation should not apply a one-size-fits-all approach, but should ask: does a specific management team or foundation still have substantial influence over protocol changes, economic parameter adjustments, or ecosystem direction? Do protocol upgrades depend on a small number of actors? Do burn mechanisms, staking mechanisms, and ecosystem incentives create structures similar to profit expectations? Are these changes transparent, verifiable, and traceable?

If a network has become sufficiently mature and the asset’s value mainly comes from the open network itself rather than a project team’s continuing operational promises, the application of securities law should contract. If the asset’s value still primarily depends on the continuing efforts of an issuer, foundation, or team, then securities law or similar disclosure obligations still have a reasonable basis.

A relatively practical standard is this: if a core development team or foundation can still exert substantial unilateral influence over protocol changes, economic parameters, ecosystem incentives, or development direction, managerial dependence remains significant. If protocol changes must go through broad community consensus and the core team can no longer unilaterally alter key parameters, managerial dependence tends to weaken.

VI. Digital Collectibles: Fractionalization Is Not the Key; Managerial Dependence Is

Digital collectibles usually include artwork, music, videos, trading cards, gaming items, internet memes, virtual characters, or other digital representations. Whether they constitute securities cannot be determined simply by whether they take the form of an NFT, whether they are transferable, or whether they are fractionalized.

Fractionalization itself is not the securities problem. A physical collectible may be jointly owned; an artwork may have divided interests; an NFT may also be divided into shares. The key is whether the buyer’s expectation of profit depends on the issuer’s or manager’s continuing efforts in operation, promotion, updating, licensing, revenue distribution, or asset management.

If a digital collectible is merely a digital object that can be collected, displayed, and traded, and its value mainly comes from scarcity, aesthetics, cultural identity, market supply and demand, and collecting consensus, it generally should not be simply treated as a security.

But if the digital collectible is connected to continuing operating arrangements, such as an issuer’s commitment to develop film, games, music rights, commercial IP, revenue distribution, or a continuously operated ecosystem, the buyer’s profit expectation may increasingly depend on the efforts of others. At that point, the securities-law issue no longer arises from the NFT form, but from the underlying managerial dependence and rights arrangement.

Therefore, NFT regulation should not focus only on “whether it is fractionalized.” It should focus on whether value is created by the continuing operation of others, whether rights are clear, whether facts are verifiable, and whether responsibility can be traced.

VII. Digital Tools: Utility Does Not Necessarily Exclude Securities Characteristics

Digital tools usually have functions such as membership, tickets, access credentials, ownership certificates, identity badges, or use within a particular system. Generally speaking, if a token exists merely for the use of a service and does not carry profit rights, asset claims, or expectations of operating returns, it should not be easily classified as a security.

However, utility does not necessarily exclude securities characteristics. If a digital tool also becomes an indispensable core component of a system, and if its price appreciation mainly depends on the project team’s continuing development, promotion, operation, and ecosystem expansion, then it is no longer merely an ordinary tool.

To determine whether a digital tool constitutes a security, regulation should not merely ask whether it has a function. It should ask whether it substantively represents system value, whether it leads buyers to reasonably expect profits through the managerial efforts of others, whether rights have been promised, and whether there are verifiable usage boundaries and responsibility structures.

The real problem with digital tools is that functionality, investment attributes, and system value may become mixed. What regulation must identify is not the name, but the economic substance.

In reality, there are also many hybrid tokens that simultaneously possess governance, usage, revenue, staking, ecosystem incentive, and platform-right attributes. Such assets cannot be judged by a single label. They should be disassembled layer by layer according to the five foundational questions: first whether enforceable rights exist, then whether value depends on managerial efforts, and finally whether key facts are verifiable and responsibility is traceable.

VIII. The Core of Stablecoin Regulation Is Not Payment, but Verifiable Reserves, Liabilities, and Redemption

Payment stablecoins are often understood as payment tools. This direction is not wrong. But if regulation regards stablecoins only as payment tools, it will underestimate their real credit risk. The core issue of stablecoins is not whether they can be used for payment, but whether reserves are real, liabilities are complete, redemption is reliable, issuance and burning are consistent, and on-chain and off-chain records match.

Stablecoins are not necessarily securities, but they always involve credit. When users hold stablecoins, what they truly care about is whether there are sufficient reserves behind them, what the quality of reserve assets is, whether liabilities are fully recorded, whether the issuer has misappropriated assets, whether the redemption channel is open, and who bears responsibility in abnormal circumstances.

These problems cannot be fully solved by traditional disclosure. Periodic audits, institutional statements, and regulatory spot checks have value, but they are still insufficient to support large-scale real-time financial activity. Stablecoins naturally require continuous verification.

Therefore, stablecoin regulation should move beyond the surface question of “whether it is a payment tool” and toward a verifiable structure of “reserves—liabilities—issuance—burning—redemption—responsibility.” The high-grade credit of stablecoins should not come only from the issuer’s license; it should also come from the continuous verifiability of key facts.

IX. From Formal Classification to Verifiable Classification

The latest U.S. regulatory interpretation has already taken a step forward: it recognizes that different crypto assets cannot simply be subjected to the same securities framework. But the more important next step is the shift from formal classification to verifiable classification.

Formal classification asks: is it a digital commodity, a digital collectible, a digital tool, a stablecoin, or a digital security?

Verifiable classification asks: what is its source of value? Does it carry a rights structure? Does it depend on the managerial efforts of others? Are its key facts verifiable? Is its responsibility traceable?

These two types of questions do not conflict. Formal classification can serve as the regulatory entry point, while verifiable classification should become the deeper logic of judgment. Without verifiable classification, formal classification can easily be circumvented through packaging, naming, and legal-structure design.

Effective future regulation should not only require project parties to disclose white papers, risk warnings, and team information. It should also require key facts to enter verifiable structures. Issuance rules, supply changes, reserve status, liability structures, permission changes, major commitments, settlement results, and responsibility records should all enter verification systems at different levels according to asset type and risk level.

X. The Regulatory Framework of Verifiable Regulation: Not Replacing Law, but Giving Law a Better Factual Foundation

Verifiable regulation does not replace law with technology, nor does it replace regulators with blockchain. Law is still needed to define rights; regulation is still needed to set boundaries; courts are still needed to resolve disputes; audits are still needed to judge accounting facts; and institutions are still needed to bear responsibility.

However, law and regulation cannot remain for long in the mode of after-the-fact inspection, investigation, and accountability. In the AI+Crypto era, financial activities move faster, structures are more complex, and on-chain and off-chain connections are denser. Traditional periodic regulation alone will have difficulty detecting risks in time.

The role of verifiable regulation is to place key facts in advance into structures that can be reviewed, replayed, and traced. Regulators do not need to view all data in real time, nor must they require all businesses to be fully public. But they should require that key facts be independently verifiable when necessary.

Transparency merely allows people to see; verifiability allows people to review. Decentralization is not a regulatory exemption certificate; verifiability is the foundational language of new financial regulation. Centralized services are not necessarily unacceptable; opaque and unverifiable centralization is the risk that regulation should truly watch.

XI. Conclusion: From the Howey Test to Verifiable Regulation

The Howey test will not disappear, and securities law will not disappear. Any arrangement that depends on the managerial efforts of others, promises profits, and forms an investment contract should still be subject to securities law or similar investor-protection rules.

However, the AI+Crypto era has already produced a large number of new assets that the old language of securities law cannot fully explain. Bitcoin is not an enterprise security. Mature network assets do not necessarily represent managerial efforts. NFTs do not automatically become securities because they are fractionalized. Digital tools do not necessarily exclude securities characteristics simply because they have utility. Stablecoins also cannot be reduced merely to payment tools.

The real regulatory difficulty is not to place all tokens into old frameworks, but to establish a more accurate new language: use value source to identify the nature of an asset, use rights structure to judge legal relationships, use managerial dependence to determine the boundary of Howey’s application, use verifiability to improve credit quality, and use responsibility traceability to absorb the consequences of risk.

This is the transition from the Howey test to verifiable regulation.

The core of future crypto-asset regulation should not be merely “security or commodity,” but rather: are the facts verifiable, is responsibility traceable, and is credit built on a reviewable structure? If the United States wants to truly lead the new financial order of the AI+Crypto era, it cannot stop at building a token classification framework. It also needs to build a regulatory framework for verifiable finance.

Crypto-asset classification cannot be based on form alone. Value source, managerial dependence, and verifiable structure are the key criteria for determining the nature of crypto assets.

Reference Note

The U.S. regulatory background discussed in this article mainly includes the SEC’s March 2026 interpretation on the application of federal securities laws to crypto assets, the CFTC’s corresponding statement regarding that interpretation, the payment-stablecoin regulatory framework under the GENIUS Act, and market-structure legislative developments related to the CLARITY Act.

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