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Complex Tasks Cannot Be Directly Authorized to AI

The Execution Plan as a New Unit of Authorization in the AI Era: A Financial Perspective

I. The Core Question: The Authorization Order for Complex Tasks

Human-AI collaboration in the AI era cannot be understood only through the model of “humans give commands, AI executes.” For deterministic problems, that model still works. But for complex tasks in finance, law, corporate management, and public governance, the real starting point is not a command. It is the joint formation of an execution plan by humans and AI.

Complex tasks cannot be directly authorized to AI. The object of authorization should not be abstract AI capability, nor a broad objective. It should be an execution plan jointly formed by humans and AI: clear in its boundaries, executable, verifiable, supervisable, and traceable in responsibility. Without such a plan, authorization has no definite object.

This execution plan is not an ordinary work proposal. It is an institutional intermediate layer before AI enters the real world. It must answer at least four questions: on what basis AI may act; how far AI may go; under what conditions AI must pause; and who ultimately bears responsibility. Only when these questions are written out in advance is authorization no longer a simple instruction to “go do it,” but confirmation of an auditable structure of action.

Many discussions about the AI era easily fall into the question of “what role is left for human beings.” This question matters, but it is not the institutional core. The real question is this: when AI is no longer merely answering questions but begins to mobilize funds, call interfaces, process accounts, trigger transactions, create contractual consequences, and change corporate or public-governance states, how should humans authorize it? How should AI be verified? How should the process be supervised? And how should responsibility return to a subject capable of bearing consequences?

When a vague command is given to a human being, the human will usually narrow the risk through experience, common sense, legal identity, and the pressure of responsibility. When the same command is given to AI, AI may translate a vague objective into multiple action paths and amplify deviations at high speed. Therefore, the more AI can execute, the less authorization can remain a single sentence. The authorization order for complex tasks must begin with an execution plan.

II. What Is a Complex Task? The Key Is Not Workload, but Determinacy

A complex task is not defined by a large amount of computation, many files, or many steps. It is a task with insufficient determinacy, a need for path selection, and consequences that cannot be treated lightly. The core test is not whether the task appears cumbersome, but whether it can be written into fixed rules before authorization.

A simple task usually has three characteristics: the input is determinate, the rule is determinate, the output is determinate, and the consequence is reversible or carries only minor responsibility. For example, “sell a stock or token when the price rises to 50” is, if the account, quantity, price, time limit, and trading method are already specified, essentially a conditional trigger command that can be automated.

A complex task is different. It usually has at least one of the following characteristics: the objective requires interpretation, such as “increase returns while controlling risk”; the path depends on intermediate results and must be adjusted according to new facts during execution; external facts change dynamically and require judgment about credibility and priority; permissions involve real resources, accounts, contracts, identities, or third-party rights; or the result is irreversible, or may create economic, legal, reputational, or public responsibility.

If the issue is extended to the entire economy, it is not enough to speak only of “high-risk tasks” or “financial tasks.” The more accurate standards are determinacy, reversibility, and responsibility consequences. Any task that cannot be written into fixed rules before authorization, and whose execution will change real states, affect the interests of others, or create responsibility consequences, should be regarded as a complex task.

Therefore, asset allocation optimization, dynamic verification of stablecoin reserves, large-scale fund transfers, intelligent execution of contracts, and assistance in major financial decisions cannot be treated as simple commands and directly authorized. They must first be transformed into execution plans that can be reviewed, authorized, and verified.

III. The Danger of Direct Authorization: Blank Delegation

Complex tasks cannot be directly authorized not because AI is incapable, but because the object of authorization has not yet been formed. Direct authorization creates a new form of blank delegation: the human believes that he is merely giving AI an objective, but in fact has handed over the power to interpret the objective, choose the path, call tools, and make part of the substantive decision.

First, the objective is unclear. Objectives such as “manage my assets well,” “reduce risk,” “complete the verification,” or “optimize the plan” must first be broken down into priorities, constraints, risk boundaries, and prohibited actions. Otherwise, AI’s interpretation of the objective may itself change the objective.

Second, the path is unclear. Complex tasks usually have multiple possible paths. Different paths correspond to different costs, risks, responsibilities, and degrees of reversibility. If the path is not determined before authorization, AI’s choice of path during execution already amounts to a substantive decision.

Third, the facts are unclear. Complex tasks often depend on external facts, such as market prices, on-chain data, audit documents, news, contractual terms, legal precedents, and counterparty status. If the sources of fact have not been confirmed, AI may produce correct reasoning on the basis of wrong facts.

Fourth, permissions are unclear. AI may call tools, access accounts, generate documents, submit instructions, trigger transactions, or affect third parties. Without layered permissions, authorization may slide from “assisted judgment” into “actual disposition.”

Fifth, responsibility is unclear. AI cannot become the ultimate responsible subject. It has no independent property and cannot truly compensate; it lacks full legal personhood and cannot bear consequences like a natural person or a legal person. Therefore, for any complex task that may create high-responsibility consequences, responsibility must return to a human being, a legal person, or another responsible organization.

These five problems together show that complex tasks cannot be authorized first and planned later. They must be planned first and authorized later. Authorization is not the starting point. The plan is the starting point.

IV. The Execution Plan as a New Unit of Authorization: A Form of “Simulated Legal Person”

One of the greatest changes in the AI era is that the object of authorization has changed. In the past, we were used to saying “authorize a person,” “authorize an institution,” “authorize a piece of software,” or “grant an app permission.” But an AI agent is not a fixed button. It is an execution system that can generate paths according to context, combine tools, call interfaces, and continuously adjust actions.

Therefore, for complex tasks, what can truly be authorized is not AI itself, but the execution plan. More precisely, the human is not stamping approval on an objective given to AI, but on an execution plan that has already been reviewed.

Here a concept may be proposed: in a complex task, the execution plan is similar to a “simulated legal person.” It is not a legal person in the juridical sense, does not own independent property, and cannot replace a natural person or legal person in bearing ultimate responsibility. It is a temporary institutional container jointly formed by humans and AI, encapsulating objectives, sources of fact, permission boundaries, verification points, pause conditions, and responsibility paths.

The significance of this analogy is that before a complex task enters execution, it must first form an intermediate structure similar to a company’s business plan, project charter, and authorization list. It does not bear ultimate responsibility, but it carries four functions required for authorization: providing the basis for action, limiting the boundary of permissions, setting pause conditions, and preserving the loop of responsibility. Without this intermediate structure, AI execution becomes unbounded action.

A qualified execution plan should contain at least seven elements: task objectives and constraints; sources of fact and verification points; execution steps and sequence; permission boundaries and prohibited actions; process verification and logging; exception handling and pause mechanisms; and the responsible subject and path of accountability.

These seven items are not a technical checklist, but conditions for valid authorization. The task objective answers “what is to be done”; the source of fact answers “on what basis it is to be done”; the execution steps answer “in what sequence it is to be done”; the permission boundary answers “how far it may go and where it must stop”; the verification method answers “how to prove that it was done and done correctly”; exception handling answers “how to pause when new facts, conflicts, excesses, or failures arise”; and the responsible subject answers “who ultimately bears the consequences.”

Only after these elements have been made explicit, written down, and reviewed and confirmed by humans does authorization have a definite object. Otherwise, authorization is merely a blank check for an unknown path.

V. Humans and AI Jointly Form the Execution Plan

An execution plan cannot be made entirely by humans alone, nor can AI freely generate it and then directly execute it. The reasonable model is for humans and AI to jointly form the plan.

The human role is to set purposes, value judgments, risk preferences, responsibility-bearing capacity, and non-negotiable bottom lines. The AI role is to break objectives into steps, conditions, checkpoints, permission levels, and risk lists; to simulate different paths and their consequences; and to point out facts and contradictions that humans may have missed. Humans then review, revise, delete, supplement, and finally confirm the plan.

This process is itself a new mechanism of plan formation. In the past, many complex judgments were hidden in experience, tacit understanding, and on-the-spot discretion. In the AI era, these judgments must be made explicit as conditions, rules, thresholds, sources of fact, pause points, and responsibility paths. Only then can AI execute, systems verify, organizations audit, and law assign responsibility.

For high-risk tasks, third-party AI evaluation may also be introduced. The execution AI is responsible for proposing the plan and execution path; a verification AI or audit AI is responsible for finding loopholes, ambiguous boundaries, factual conflicts, and omitted risks. The third-party AI does not execute directly. It only outputs risk assessments and revision suggestions for human decision makers to review. This does not hand judgment over to machines. It uses machines to challenge machines within a human responsibility framework, thereby strengthening the robustness of the plan.

At present, many AI financial applications still remain at the level of the “executor”: receiving instructions, completing calculations, generating reports, or triggering operations. But the full capability of generative AI is not limited to execution. It also includes the roles of assistant, collaborator, and adviser. What this article discusses is precisely this latter layer: AI not only executes plans, but also participates in forming, checking, and improving them.

After a specific complex task has been repeatedly verified, it can be solidified into a process, and the process can then be solidified into an app or system. The more important future change is that AI may not merely execute existing processes. It may propose process upgrades, which humans review and confirm before they are solidified into new applications. Human-AI collaboration thus moves from the execution layer into the planning layer and the layer of institutional design.

VI. Authorization Is Not a Single Click, but Layered, Dynamic, and Revocable

Authorization of complex tasks should not be understood as a single click of consent. One-time consent is suitable for simple functions, not for high-responsibility tasks. Complex tasks require layered authorization, dynamic authorization, and revocable authorization.

Layered authorization means distinguishing the actions in an execution plan by risk level. Low-risk, reversible, small-amount, and limited-impact actions may be automatically executed within the plan and logged. Medium-risk actions may require confirmation before execution or time-limited reporting after execution. High-risk, irreversible, large-amount actions, or actions involving third-party rights or legal responsibility, must pause and request renewed authorization. Any action outside the original plan must not be automatically executed.

Dynamic authorization means that when new facts, new risks, new paths, or circumstances not covered by the plan arise during execution, AI must report back to humans. Humans then decide whether to continue, continue after modifying the plan, grant additional authorization, or terminate the task. Revocable authorization means that humans should retain the ability to pause, revoke, and withdraw permissions at any key stage.

A simplified example is that an execution plan may classify steps as L1 automatic execution, L2 automatic execution with logging, L3 post-execution reporting, L4 pre-execution confirmation, and L5 confirmation by a specified responsible person or multiple parties. In this way, supervision is no longer a matter of humans watching every step taken by AI. It is the use of preset boundaries to keep AI within the authorized range.

VII. Verification Must Be Embedded in Execution, Not Added as an Afterthought

Once a complex task enters execution, verification cannot wait until after the fact. Ex post auditing can only explain problems; it cannot prevent losses from expanding. The faster AI executes and the wider the range of tools it can call, the more verification must be embedded in the execution process.

Each key node in the execution plan should have a corresponding verification point. A verification point may take the form of data-source validation, signature confirmation, balance reconciliation, permission checking, threshold judgment, state-change recording, hash logging, comparison with third-party facts, human confirmation, or audit replay. Different scenarios may adopt different forms, but the principle is the same: key facts must be recorded and proven during execution, not explained after the fact in language.

This is also the meaning of verifiable finance. The core of finance is not verbal promises, but accounts, balances, liabilities, collateral, transactions, settlement, authorization, responsibility, and time sequence. AI can interpret these facts, but it cannot replace them. Without a trustworthy fact layer, the stronger AI becomes, the greater the risk. With a trustworthy fact layer, AI can become a highly efficient executor.

Take stablecoin reserve verification as an example. AI cannot merely output the conclusion that “reserves are sufficient.” The execution plan must specify which accounts are to be verified, which liability data are to be read, how reserves are to be matched with issuance volume, which discrepancies trigger a pause, which results generate audit logs, and which exceptions must be confirmed by a responsible person. Only then is AI’s judgment not a black-box opinion, but verifiable execution.

VIII. Responsibility Must Return to Humans or Legal Persons Through the Execution Plan

AI may participate in plan formation, execute plans, and supervise part of the process, but it cannot become the ultimate responsible subject. Responsibility is not an abstract ethical slogan. In legal and economic systems, responsibility means being answerable, punishable, compensable, restrictable, and replaceable. AI does not currently possess such subject status.

Therefore, the stronger AI execution becomes, the clearer the responsible subject must be. The execution plan must specify who proposed the objective, who confirmed the sources of fact, who approved the plan, who holds final authorization authority, who is responsible for supervision, who bears responsibility for losses, and who preserves the audit records.

The function of the “simulated legal person” is not to make the execution plan bear responsibility by itself, but to allow responsibility to be traced back along the sequence of plan, authorization, execution, verification, exception, and result. Ultimate responsibility still returns to the natural person, legal person, or responsible organization behind it.

The return of responsibility does not mean that humans must personally do everything. On the contrary, in the AI era, a large amount of execution can be handed over to machines, but responsibility cannot be handed over to machines. Humans may authorize execution power, but they cannot transfer the status of responsible subject. Legal persons may use AI to improve efficiency, but cannot evade responsibility by saying “AI did it by itself.” The logic is simple: when a company employee causes losses and the employee cannot bear them, the company usually remains ultimately responsible.

Therefore, the return of responsibility is not a regression in the AI era. It is a prerequisite for AI to enter high-risk tasks at scale. Without responsibility returning to an accountable subject, society will not dare to authorize AI. Without a verifiable responsibility chain, law cannot assign accountability. Without a responsible subject, AI execution cannot become part of an institutional order.

Conclusion: Plan Before Authorization, Verification During Execution, Responsibility Back to the Subject

Verifiable finance provides the factual infrastructure. Account states, transaction records, authorization records, responsibility records, audit logs, hash proofs, and external anchoring can all become the factual foundation for AI execution. Without these foundations, AI financial agents may become faster, more complex, and harder-to-trace black boxes. With these foundations, AI financial agents may become the highly efficient execution layer of transparent banks and new financial infrastructure.

On this basis, the judgment of this article can be compressed into three rules. First, complex tasks cannot be directly authorized; they must first be transformed into execution plans jointly formed by humans and AI. Second, execution plans cannot rely only on promises; they must embed verification, supervision, and pause mechanisms. Third, no matter how strong AI execution becomes, ultimate responsibility must return to humans or legal persons.

These rules do not restrict AI. They release AI. Only when the object of authorization is definite, verification mechanisms are reliable, supervision can pause the process, and responsible subjects are clear will society and markets dare to entrust more important and more complex tasks to human-AI systems. Otherwise, the stronger AI becomes, the less society will dare to authorize it; the more AI can execute, the more regulation will tighten; the closer AI moves to the core of finance and law, the more markets will fear black-box risk.

Mature human-AI collaboration in the AI era is not humans stepping aside, nor AI taking over completely. It is first to transform complex tasks into authorizable execution plans, then allow AI to execute efficiently within the scope of those plans, while key facts remain continuously verifiable, exceptional circumstances can be paused, and ultimate responsibility can return to subjects capable of bearing consequences.

This may be the most basic institutional principle after AI enters the core processes of finance, law, corporate management, and public governance: complex tasks cannot be directly authorized to AI; execution plans must first be jointly formed by humans and AI, and only then may execution be authorized.

When the basis of credit shifts toward verifiable finance, financial order will gain new solutions that are more efficient, more reliable, and safer. But these solutions will not emerge automatically. They require people, organizations, rules, and wisdom to transform complex tasks step by step into execution plans that can be authorized, verified, supervised, and traced in responsibility.

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