From Single-Institution Credit to an Open Verifiable Stablecoin Network
To explain this issue, we must begin with the current problem of stablecoins. Put simply, the mainstream method of stablecoin issuance is still a “Stone Age method”: it packages traditional institutional credit into on-chain tokens, but it does not truly solve the continuous verification of reserves, liabilities, clearing, responsibility, and regulatory replay. Solving this problem requires the idea of Verifiable Finance. For this, one may refer to my book From Double-Entry Bookkeeping to the Revolution of Verifiable Finance.
1. Core Judgment: Stablecoins Cannot Merely Wear the Shell of Cryptocurrency
The deepest essence of cryptocurrency is not speculation, token packaging, or simply moving traditional financial products onto a chain. It is openness, transparency, verifiability, and the restoration of users’ financial rights. What the Bitcoin system truly created was not merely an asset, but a credit-generation system based on a public ledger: anyone can verify it, no one can tamper with it without leaving traces, and no center can unilaterally determine ledger history.
Measured by this standard, the current mainstream method of stablecoin issuance is still at a very early stage. Although it wears the shell of cryptocurrency, its credit mechanism still relies mainly on a single issuer, custodian banks, periodic audits, and regulatory endorsement. On-chain tokens can be queried, but off-chain reserves cannot be continuously verified. Users can see transfer records, but they cannot recompute reserves, liabilities, clearing, responsibility, and risk.
Therefore, criticizing this model as backward is not to deny stablecoins themselves, nor to deny regulation. It is to point out that if a stablecoin merely packages traditional institutional credit into an on-chain token, it has not truly inherited the verifiable-ledger idea created by Satoshi Nakamoto. The next generation of real stablecoins should move from “trusting the issuer” to “verifying the act of issuance.”
2. Three Fundamental Problems in the Existing Stablecoin Model
First, stablecoin names and issuing entities are excessively fragmented, and they lack a unified monetary logic. A country usually has only one circulating fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar in the United States or the euro in the euro area. If stablecoins become “one bank, one name; one institution, one brand,” the result will be a large number of fragmented stablecoin names. Users will find them hard to recognize, markets will find them hard to unify, and regulators will find them hard to penetrate. This is not progress in the monetary system, but a regression in monetary expression. Cryptocurrency has already proved that the issuance of countless coins does not mean users can understand, remember, and use them. Money first requires unified recognition; chaotic naming only increases identification and memory costs.
Second, stablecoins lack a truly clear final guarantee structure. Fiat currency is supported by a central bank, law, a clearing system, and banking supervision, while most stablecoins are separately backed by their respective issuers. Once one issuer has a problem, the market often begins to doubt the entire stablecoin industry. If stablecoins expand comprehensively while off-chain reserves, clearing, liabilities, and responsibility still cannot be continuously verified, systemic risk may far exceed the capacity of any single institution. The key questions are: who is the ultimate rescuer? Where is the final responsibility chain?
Third, the existing model naturally tends toward monopoly. A small number of large issuers, exchanges, and custodians will control the issuance entrance, liquidity entrance, and redemption entrance of stablecoins. They may acquire influence close to that of financial infrastructure, but they do not necessarily bear public responsibilities comparable to a central bank. Over time, stablecoins may degenerate from open financial tools into new centralized infrastructure, increasingly requiring national-level credit endorsement.
3. The Core of Satoshi’s Idea: Trust Through Public Verification
Satoshi Nakamoto’s most important creation was not simply a digital asset, but a verifiable ledger system that does not require trust in any single institution. Its core spirit can be summarized in four points: openness and transparency, so everyone can verify; fair rules, so everyone can join; immutable history; and an ownerless system governed only by consensus and coordination.
In one sentence: trust is generated by publicly verifying whether history has been tampered with. The Bitcoin system itself constitutes a public credit root; it does not rely on any higher verification root to prove itself. This is the fundamental difference between Bitcoin and the traditional financial system.
If stablecoins are to truly enter the cryptocurrency and AI era, they cannot stop at “on-chain verifiability and off-chain unverifiability.” The on-chain token is only the result. Off-chain reserves, bank liabilities, clearing paths, permission calls, responsible entities, and regulatory events are the real core of stablecoin credit. As long as these remain black boxes, a stablecoin cannot possess trust in the same way Bitcoin does; the credit it requires will not differ much from the institutional credit of ordinary fiat finance.
4. What We Need Is a Verifiable Stablecoin, Not an On-Chain Package of Traditional Stablecoins
A verifiable stablecoin, also called a transparent stablecoin, is not arbitrary token generation on a decentralized network. It is an on-chain verifiable expression of a funding liability or funding acceptance relationship under a licensed commercial bank.
The generation of a stablecoin is only the result. A complete issuance must also include fund acceptance, reserve arrangement, rights confirmation, accounting mapping, consistency between on-chain and off-chain records, responsibility records, result disclosure, and regulatory replay. In other words, a verifiable stablecoin is not “issuing a coin”; it is converting a funding-based financial act into a verifiable fact.
In this system, traditional banks, law, regulation, and audit remain important, but they cannot merely provide conclusions. They must enter a verifiable structure. Whether reserves are real, whether liabilities are clear, whether clearing has been completed, whether permissions have been abused, and whether history has been modified should not remain only in reports, audits, and ex post accountability. They should enter the domains of continuous proof, public anchoring, and computable regulation.
We call banks capable of providing this service Transparent Banks. A Transparent Bank does not disclose all customer privacy; rather, it places key financial facts into verifiable structures, reference chains, and responsibility chains.
5. An Open Stablecoin Issuance Network: Any Qualified Bank Can Join
This proposal takes the euro stablecoin as its main target scenario. The euro itself is not the currency of a single institution; it is a common currency operating across countries, banks, and financial markets. Therefore, if a euro stablecoin were issued only by one centralized company, it would not fit the institutional nature of the euro.
A more reasonable direction is to build an open euro stablecoin network with multi-bank participation, unified verification rules, unified technical standards, and unified regulatory replay capability. This is not a company’s stablecoin, but a verifiable euro stablecoin issuance network.
In this network, any bank that meets regulatory, compliance, capital, reserve, and technical-access requirements can become a stablecoin issuing node. Bank A can issue eEUR, Bank B can issue eEUR, and Bank C can also issue eEUR. They use the same stablecoin name, technical standards, verification interfaces, and regulatory framework.
At the bottom layer, however, each issuance is clearly marked: which bank issued it, which bank collateral account it corresponds to, which user deposit it corresponds to, whether the bank business process is verifiable, and whether on-chain and off-chain consistency has been achieved. Thus the system realizes unified branding with multi-bank issuance; a unified network with distributed responsibility; and unified verification without single-point credit.
This both avoids monopoly by a single institution and preserves the legal responsibility and settlement capacity of banks as licensed financial institutions.
6. User-Triggered Issuance: Users Become the Trigger of Stablecoin Issuance
User-triggered issuance does not mean that every natural person can bypass regulation and licensing to become a legal stablecoin issuer. It means that any qualified user can, through a licensed bank or compliant issuing institution, convert their fiat deposit into the corresponding stablecoin and thereby trigger a compliant stablecoin issuance act.
In legal responsibility, the issuer remains the bank or licensed institution. The user is not the statutory issuer, but the issuance trigger, asset provider, and stablecoin holder.
This structure differs from the traditional banking system. In traditional banking, a user deposits money into a bank, the bank keeps internal accounts, and the user can only passively accept the bank ledger. In a transparent stablecoin system, after a user deposits euros into a bank, the user can obtain corresponding eEUR through a collateral or conversion mechanism. In this process, the source of funds, collateral account, issuance quantity, issuance responsibility, accounting changes, and audit proof should all enter the reference chain of the Unchained system and be verifiable through browsers, APIs, AI audits, and regulatory event packages.
Stablecoins no longer mainly come from issuers pre-minting and then selling them. They come from demand-based issuance after real user deposits. The process can be summarized as: user deposit, bank acceptance, system minting, and platform verification.
This is the stablecoin issuance method that truly approaches the open spirit of cryptocurrency: it does not allow a few institutions to monopolize the entrance to digital money. Instead, it allows every qualified user, within a compliant framework, to convert their fiat assets into digital cash that is verifiable, transferable, and redeemable. It must be emphasized that this design does not bypass the law; it gives users unprecedented financial initiative within the legal framework. Its institutional significance is to return financial privilege from the few to the many.
7. Separating Redemption From Conversion: Clear Responsibility and Market Competition
This system must strictly distinguish redemption from conversion. Redemption is issuing responsibility; conversion is market liquidity.
Redemption should follow the principle of “where it is issued, there it is redeemed.” eEUR issued by Bank A is ultimately redeemed by Bank A to the original triggerer in euros; eEUR issued by Bank B is redeemed by Bank B in euros. This principle ensures that responsibility is not confused and that the liabilities of different banks are not concealed by a unified name.
But conversion does not necessarily have to return to the original issuing bank. Users may redeem through the issuing bank, or they may complete fiat-stablecoin conversion through other banks, conversion funds, or liquidity pools. Redemption solves responsibility; conversion solves efficiency.
The institutional significance of this structure is that the responsibility layer remains strict while the liquidity layer remains open. Banks still bear issuance and redemption responsibility, but the conversion market is no longer monopolized by a single bank’s counter quote. Users can choose the lowest-cost and most efficient path among bank conversion, platform conversion funds, and liquidity pools.
8. Conversion Funds and Liquidity Pools: Reducing Currency Conversion Friction
In addition to a redemption mechanism, the system should also provide market-based conversion functions. Conversion funds or liquidity pools can become important infrastructure in a transparent stablecoin network.
One side of a conversion pool holds fiat currency, such as euros; the other side holds euro stablecoins, such as eEUR. Users can contribute euros or eEUR. When other users conduct conversions, liquidity providers receive fee income.
This is not an ordinary DeFi pool for speculative trading in high-volatility tokens. It is a rule-constrained, auditable, and replayable fiat-stablecoin liquidity market. Its significance lies in at least five areas: improving stablecoin liquidity; lowering the threshold for users across banks and regions; forming a transparent market-based pricing and fee mechanism; allowing users as liquidity providers to receive a share of conversion fees; and, when many small users participate, making liquidity more dispersed, reducing price fluctuation, and creating a certain market stability buffer.
It should be emphasized that this mechanism is not a lender of last resort in the central-bank sense. It is a distributed market liquidity buffer. It cannot replace central banks or banking supervision, but it can significantly reduce friction in stablecoin conversion and reduce the system’s reliance on rescue by a single institution under extreme conditions.
This verifiable structure can also improve capital efficiency. Banks do not need to reserve excessive buffer capital for unverifiable black boxes; regulators can also dynamically adjust risk-control requirements based on real-time verification data, ultimately reducing the financial intermediation cost of society as a whole.
9. A Way for Banks to Actively Accept Section 404 of the CLARITY Act
The core controversy raised by Section 404 of the CLARITY Act is not whether stablecoins can generate any economic benefit at all, but whether payment stablecoins can, like bank deposits, earn passive interest or yield merely because a balance is held. If stablecoin interest is simply allowed, stablecoins will directly compete with bank deposits and may form a new shadow-deposit system outside the banking system. If all forms of benefit are simply prohibited, stablecoins will lose the participation incentive of commercial banks and the usage incentive of real users.
A transparent stablecoin system can provide a third answer: the stablecoin itself pays no interest, while the bank fiat side may pay interest; however, the qualification for interest is not determined by the stablecoin balance, but jointly by real activity verified by the Unchained platform and by the status of the stablecoin. In other words, users do not receive interest because they “hold stablecoins.” They receive bank-side interest qualification because they keep the corresponding fiat deposit at the bank, complete real and verifiable tasks on the Unchained platform, and the corresponding stablecoin has not left their control.
This mechanism can be called the “1:1 Verifiable Task-Based Interest Mechanism.” A user deposits fiat at 1:1 and triggers stablecoin issuance. The bank simultaneously records the fiat reserve, the stablecoin issuance batch, and the interest qualification. The stablecoin can be issued 1:1, circulate 1:1, and be redeemed 1:1, but the interest qualification cannot circulate with the stablecoin. The stablecoin is a payment credential; the interest qualification is a verifiable task credential.
For a bank to pay interest to a user, five conditions must be satisfied at the same time. First, the user remains the original fiat depositor. Second, the corresponding stablecoin remains in the user’s own KYC-certified wallet and under the verifiable control of the transparent platform. Third, the stablecoin has not been “released from the user’s hand” through payment, transfer, conversion, external collateralization, cross-chain movement, or external custody. Fourth, the user has completed real, verifiable, fee-generating financial activity on the Unchained platform, such as payment settlement, merchant transactions, reserve verification, accounting verification, or regulatory reporting verification. Fifth, all states are recorded by the Unchained system and periodically hashed and anchored to the Bitcoin public credit root.
The state of a stablecoin being “released from the user’s hand” must be legalized and systematized. Any transfer, payment, conversion, collateralization, redemption, cross-chain movement, transfer into an external exchange, or transfer of economic control through an affiliated account, smart contract, atomic swap, or similar structure should be treated as such release. Once this occurs, the system immediately terminates the interest qualification corresponding to that batch of stablecoins, and the bank stops paying interest to the original user from that timestamp.
In this way, circular collateralization and idle arbitrage are cut off at the first step. If a user uses stablecoins for payment or converts them into another stablecoin, the original fiat deposit’s interest qualification immediately goes out. If the user wants to obtain interest qualification again, a new fiat deposit, stablecoin issuance, real task, and non-release state must be formed. This is no longer the same funds repeatedly earning interest; each instance must pass through verifiable business facts.
This also explains why the Unchained platform is the key to this proposal. Ordinary exchanges or wallets find it difficult to know the complete source of a particular stablecoin, the original depositor, the issuing bank, the reserve status, whether it has passed through multiple transfers, and whether it still has reward eligibility. This is why platforms may reward tasks even when they do not know the source of the stablecoin. The Unchained platform is different. It can verify which bank reserve, which issuance batch, and which original user each stablecoin corresponds to; whether the stablecoin has left the user’s control; whether a real task has been completed; whether the platform collected a fee; and whether the bank stopped or paid interest according to the rules.
As a result, banks also have sufficient incentive to participate. Banks receive stable fiat deposits, compliant interest spreads, issuance and redemption service fees, verification service fees, enterprise settlement fees, and data-service income. After the stablecoin leaves the original user’s control, the original user no longer has interest qualification, and the relevant reserve income may legally enter bank income, risk reserves, or a platform compliance incentive pool. Banks are not having deposits drained by stablecoins; they become issuing nodes, reserve nodes, verification nodes, and income nodes in the transparent stablecoin network.
The essence of this system is that 1:1 can be preserved, but yield cannot run out of control; users can receive incentives, but those incentives must come from real activity; banks can earn income, but that income must be subject to verification; stablecoins can circulate freely, but interest qualification cannot circulate. Without the thinking of Verifiable Finance, it is very difficult to achieve both sides of this problem.
10. Regulatory and Audit Replay: From Ex Post Inspection to Regulation at Execution
The core of a transparent stablecoin is not only issuance, but the complete replayability of every issuance, redemption, and conversion.
The complete path of a user-triggered issuance should include the user request, identity verification, KYC/AML judgment, jurisdictional restrictions and limit checks, routing selection, execution results, accounting acceptance, fact notarization, responsibility records, regulatory event packages, Unchained blocks, Bitcoin anchoring, and audit replay.
Regulators can use open Replay interfaces to conduct “videotape-style replay” of any issuance batch, redemption request, or conversion path. AI audit systems can recompute the true operator, rule-call path, fiat segregation balance, on-balance-sheet bank liability, stablecoin issuance amount, and legal responsible party for a given fund at a specific time slice.
This upgrades financial compliance from ex post sampling reports to a verifiable financial form of “regulation at execution.”
11. Why This Is the Standard Method for the Crypto + AI Era
Future finance will increasingly rely on AI agents, automated audits, machine risk control, and real-time regulation. But AI itself is not a source of credit. AI cannot turn unverified data into credible facts; it can only analyze data that has already been structured, recomputable, traceable, and anchored.
Therefore, what the Crypto + AI era truly needs is not more unverifiable financial black boxes, but infrastructure that provides verifiable financial facts for AI.
The transparent stablecoin network is precisely such infrastructure. It converts bank liabilities, user deposits, stablecoin issuance, conversion paths, responsible entities, and regulatory events into computable, referable, and replayable data structures. On this basis, AI can conduct anomaly detection, risk explanation, multi-source comparison, and automated audit.
This is also why the system is closer to Satoshi’s idea: it does not simply move institutional credit onto a chain; it converts financial facts into verifiable structures. On-chain must be transparent, and off-chain must also enter verification.
12. Conclusion: Do Not Use Old-Finance Thinking to Understand Satoshi
If stablecoins are issued by only a few institutions, custodied by only a few banks, proved by periodic reports, and passively trusted by users, then they are merely an on-chain package of traditional finance. They may have commercial value, but they do not represent progress in the financial paradigm.
The real next-generation stablecoin should be an open, multi-bank, user-triggered, responsibility-differentiated, conversion-competitive, regulatorily replayable, historically anchored verifiable stablecoin network.
The first stage of dollar stablecoins was centralized stablecoins led by a few companies. Euro stablecoins do not need to repeat this path. Euro stablecoins can directly enter the second stage: a verifiable stablecoin network jointly accessed by multiple banks, directly triggered by users, supported by liquidity pools to reduce conversion costs, recorded by Unchained, historically anchored by Bitcoin, and continuously supervised by regulatory event packages.
This is not one company’s stablecoin, but a verifiable euro stablecoin issuance network.
We do not abandon banks; we make banks transparent issuing nodes. We do not cancel regulation; we upgrade regulation from ex post reports to real-time replay. We do not repeat old finance; we use the verifiable idea created by Satoshi to reconstruct financial infrastructure for the digital-currency era.
The above proposal addresses the three fundamental problems of the existing stablecoin model, and real projects are already being advanced. Many financial, compliance, and engineering questions still need to be tested through regulatory sandboxes and real business scenarios, but the direction is already clear: stablecoins cannot remain at the stage of old finance packaged on-chain. They must move toward a new financial infrastructure that is open, verifiable, and capable of regulatory replay.
